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The right to privacy is fundamental to a democratic society. It is the
stronghold that maintains our freedom of speech, allowing us to express per-
sonal and political opinions without fear of judgement or retribution. It is the
right to privacy that allows us to withhold our medical conditions from the
public eye, to publish articles critical of the state, to conceal our private rela-
tionships and business.
As technology advances and becomes more accessible to the average per-
son, privacy has become the unwilling victim of computational advancement.
Thanks to Moore’s Law, data processing capabilities once considered unthink-
able have now become accessible to the average consumer. In the context of
privacy violation, this has a significant impact on one’s ability to deanonymize:
data can be processed at an increasingly rapid pace, allowing databases to be
matched, or social graphs to be aligned, at large scale.
This phenomenon becomes more detrimental to privacy when coupled with
advancements in machine learning techniques and theory. Fundamentally, ma-
chine learning is used to draw conclusions from or about a dataset—this includes
datasets of personal information. Machine learning is capable of comprehend-
ing the relationships between variables far better than a human; it gives us the
ability to make inferences about sensitive characteristics, even from seemingly
insensitive ones present in a dataset.
These advancements in database matching and machine learning simply
mandate us to reevaluate our level of protection against privacy threats. Pri-
vacy was once able to be assumed out of magnitude: applying the motivated
intruder test suggests an anonymized dataset’s safety ought to be evaluated
through its capability against a reasonably proficient adversary, not an individ-
ual with specialized resources or knowledge [26]. In the recent past, an average
person without specialized equipment or knowledge would not have been able to
process large scale data in the manner necessary to employ database matching or
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machine learning mechanisms effectively. This is no longer a safe assumption.
As we must change our approach to defense when an enemy grows stronger,
so too we must transform the defense of our privacy. A new understanding of
dataset evaluation has proven necessary: an understanding that accounts for the
ability to process both internal and external data with the new tools available,
to create data from what is not there, and to connect data that, to a human,
seems unrelated.
When private data is released inappropriately, it can cause substantial harm.
There are serious financial, social, or legal consequences for individuals who have
data about them released to an adversary. Consider an individual who has fi-
nancial data leaked, leaving them vulnerable to fraud. Or, consider the leakage
of more personal information, such as an individual’s sexuality, gender identity,
or other personal information–in some countries, leakage of this can be a matter
of life or death. It is crucial to assess the harm posed by a dataset before release,
as this data has a very real impact on human lives.
Thus, this work will examine how we can account for harm arising from inno-
vation in machine learning and database matching, and will propose a prefatory
method for the quantification of harm. The work’s primary contribution is to
propose a method of modeling the harm of a dataset, analyzing the risk of
deanonymization given these new factors. We carry out two experiments in
order to demonstrate the harm accompanying modern dataset applications—
the first exploring machine learning’s applications to WhatsApp social network
analysis, the second exploring the potential for large-scale database matching
between University directories and TinderU profiles. We apply our model to
these examples, to demonstrate its the efficacy in a real world setting. We
show that this model can be applied as a general framework, to guide both




In order to quantify threats to user privacy, it is crucial to understand current
methods of anonymizing and de-anonymizing datasets, as well as the related le-
gal frameworks that govern these practices. This section presents this necessary
background for our exploration.
2.1 Privacy & Policy
While the United States does not have an all-encompassing data privacy doc-
trine, such as Europe’s GDPR, there are several industry-specific, state-specific,
and age-specific acts that govern American data practices. This legislation,
originating from state and federal governing bodies, intends to protect user’s
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from violation.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is a subset of personal in-
formation that can be connected to an individual’s identity. In their Require-
ments for Personal Information Protection, the FTC cites examples such as
“name, postal address, phone number, e-mail address, social security number
and driver’s license number” [23]; however, the scope of PII is extensive and
challenging to define. As the U.S. General Services Association describes, PII
“requires a case-by-case assessment of the specific risk that an individual can
be identified using information that is linked or linkable to said individual”[6].
The greatest challenge involving PII is quantifying the impact of external
information (e.g. a separate available dataset), which can transform non-PII
into PII. In Figure 2.1, we observe two separate datasets. The first dataset
we consider to be publicly available. This dataset contains information which
could have been scraped from product reviews: names, approximate ages, and
purchase IDs. The second is a dataset that we are considering releasing to an
advertiser, containing non-PII data (device IDs, recent purchase IDs, and pur-
chaser incomes). Say we consider income or device IDs to be releasable alone,
4
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but not when associated with the name of an individual. Using purchase IDs
as a key, we can combine the two databases and deduce individuals’ income
levels. In this way, we can see a basic example of how identifiable information
can be derived through the combination of available, but not directly included,
information. This external information muddies the evaluation of data release
safety; one must look beyond the dataset itself to assess its dangers.
Figure 2.1: Demonstration of Derivation of PII
Given the absence of broad federal legislation, United States privacy reg-
ulation takes place on a smaller scale, mandating data protection in specific
circumstances. These circumstances could include factors such as the user’s
age, the user’s location, or the data’s relationship to the federal government.
Notably, the FTC’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA)
provides special protection for the data of children under 13 [4], requiring
parental consent prior to the collection of children’s personal information, with
relatively strict standards for verification [14]. Additionally, it requires that
websites serving children under 13 must outline what personal information is
collected, how it is used, and disclose all third parties that are collecting per-
sonal information. There are strict specifications about the circumstances in
which a child’s contact information may be stored, how their data may be used,
and under what conditions they may be contacted [14].
Additionally, a user’s residence location can affect their data protection. A
number of states have introduced their own data privacy legislation, to account
for the lack of federal protection. Different states’ rules range in strength: most
states simply require that businesses maintain “reasonable security procedures
and practices...to protect from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modifica-
tion, or disclosure” [40]. However, there are states with stronger regulations:
California’s CCPA stands out as an example of strong privacy legislation in
the United States. The CCPA provides consumers with control regarding what
information is collected, stored, and shared about them. It further provides con-
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sumers with a private right of action in the event of a data breach containing
PII [1]. This represents a significant increase in the scope of privacy protection:
putting power in the hands of the user.
However, outside of these highly specific situations, there is very limited na-
tional regulation regarding the treatment of consumer PII. Without regulation,
there is minimal motivation to protect PII; there is especially minimal motiva-
tion to protect PII created from inference, where a user would need to combine
personal information with public information. In Section 2.3, we will explore
this capability to infer PII using database matching and/or machine learning, in
manners currently permissible under federal legislation. We will further model
the potential harm resulting from disclosure of PII using these techniques in 3.3.
2.2 Anonymization Techniques
Researchers explore dataset modification and presentation in order to ensure
anonymity. We will explore two areas of anonymization research:
1. Methods to evaluate the privacy protection a dataset provides
2. Methods to modify the dataset in a manner that increases its anonymity
2.2.1 Evaluation
K-anonymity is a property of a dataset that represents the strength of its
protection from deanonymization, based upon the extent to which each item is
indistinguishable from the whole [48]. As defined in Zhou et al., “a dataset is
said to be k-anonymous (k ≥ 1) if, on the quasi-identifier attributes (that is,
the maximal set of join attributes to reidentify individual records), each record
is indistinguishable from at least (k − 1) other records” [57]. For this reason,
k-anonymity was introduced as a measurement of the extent to which a dataset
allows users to remain anonymous. Much other work has built upon the initial
efforts of k-anonymity; for example, the concepts of alpha-anonymity, l-diversity,
and t-closeness further explore improvement in the realm of quantification of a
dataset’s privacy.
Alpha-anonymity , a term coined by Wong et al., attempts to protect not
only the identity of a user’s sensitive information, but its relationships with
other data as well. The alpha value is meant to account for the, “confidence of
implications from values in the quasi-identifier to the sensitive value” [53].
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L-diversity , alternatively, attempts to account for an adversary’s back-
ground knowledge [36][54]. L-diversity seeks to prevent inference in disclosure,
by quantifying the amount of background knowledge needed to eliminate pos-
sible values, and thus disclose information. This amount is represented by the
parameter `.
A third alteration of k-anonymity, t-closeness, examines limitations of l-
diversity, separating the adversary’s “information gain into two parts: that
about the whole population in the released data and that about specific indi-
viduals” [32].
2.2.2 Modification
While it is important to understand measures of dataset anonymity, it is
equally important to examine the methods of achieving these designations of
k-anonymous, l-diverse, etc., and to examine how datasets can be modified to
preserve privacy. These privacy preservation methods mainly fall into the two
categories of data confidentiality and data perturbation.
Data Confidentiality
Data confidentiality (in the context of disclosure avoidance) represents the
limiting or censoring of data prior to release. Notable examples include the
protection of sensitive cells via methods such as cell suppression [45], recoding
[7], and the use of rules to redefine sensitive cells [?].
Cell suppression and other similar methods of protecting sensitive cells,
involve a process where “values of a variable are replaced by a missing value”
[45]. In other words, if a given value doesn’t fit a set of constraints, it can be
suppressed, and replaced with a value such as ‘NA’. Take the dataset in Figure
2.2: say we set a constraint that there may be no unique values for race. If
we were looking at the race cells in the table in Figure 1, we would need to
suppress Janet Doe’s race, so as to not violate our constraint. These rules used
to define sensitive cells can range from those as basic as in our example to those
involving thresholds for k-anonymity. While effective, this method of disclosure
avoidance is limiting for statisticians: missing values lead to misleading data.
Recoding is another method of data suppression, in which the range of
classifications is decreased, “by combining or grouping categories for categorical
variables or constructing intervals for continuous variables” [7]. For example,
in Figure 2.3, one may wish to suppress information regarding age of the indi-
viduals in the dataset. Through displaying an age range rather than an exact
value, we recode, and thus generalize, the data to a range of values, introducing
ambiguity. Top coding and bottom coding are very similar to recoding, except
only the top or bottom extrema of the distribution are recoded [7].
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Figure 2.2: Demonstration of cell suppression on Janet Doe’s race
Figure 2.3: Demonstration of recoding of age cells
Data Perturbation
Data perturbation , rather than masking the true data, involves the ma-
nipulation of the true data through methods including rounding, the addition
of noise, or interchanging existing data. Rounding involves the manipulation
of values to adjacent values before publication. Rounding can be random or
controlled; random rounding represents the arbitrary rounding down or up at a
set probability, by a randomly selected amount from a set range [45]. Alterna-
tively, controlled rounding does not have this random aspect in adjacent value
selection [45].
Data swapping involves the pairing “of records with similar attributes
and then interchanging identifying or sensitive data values among the pairs.”
[17, 29]. For example, in Figure 2.4, we have selected Joe Doe for swapping
on the variable of race. Thus, we would swap his data with an individual from
another dataset, Jack Doe, who is the same age and sex as Joe, but potentially
a different race. There are many variations of swapping: we may change the
number of rows intended to be swapped (which is known as the swap rate), the
variables being swapped, or the measure of similarity governing swap selection.
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Figure 2.4: Demonstration of swapping between Joe and Jack Doe.
Graph modification is also a form of data perturbation, largely implemented
in the context of social graphs. Zhou et al. set forth two main methods in
their work of data perturbation through graph modification: clustering based
methods and graph modification based methods [57].
Clustering entails grouping similar data together when sharing a dataset,
clustering it into a “super vertex” [57]. There are various approaches to cluster-
ing vertices and edges into subgroups; in Zhou et al.’s overview, vertex cluster-
ing, edge clustering, vertex and edge clustering, and vertex-attribute mapping
clustering are specifically mentioned [57]. Campan and Truta demonstrated
how clustering leads to a need for greater seed data in order to successfully de-
anonymize, thus validating its status as an anonymizing technique. However,
while generalizing data through clustering does lend to a decreased ability to
de-anonymize, they also demonstrated that there are quantifiable data losses in
the process of clustering [12].
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Alternatively, graph modification entails changing graphs on a local scale,
so as to “preserve the scale and local structures” of the original graph [56].
There are several methods of graph modification, ranging from edge deletions
and insertions, to randomly switching edges, to reweighing edge or node values
[56].
Adding noise nodes to a dataset represents another modification method.
Saptarshi and Tripathy use eigenvector centrality “to achieve k-anonymity &
l-diversity by adding noise nodes in the raw data” [13]. Differential privacy ,
as proposed in Dwork’s work [21], is another semantic approach to dataset
privacy–one of the best known methods involving the methodical addition of
random noise. This approach “can achieve any desired level of privacy”, while
still “providing extremely accurate information about the database” [21]. In
this way, modification of how data is presented can protect the privacy of those
within a dataset.
2.3 Deanonymizing Techniques
Given the relatively weak legal framework preventing deanonymization, it is
natural to examine current deanonymizing techniques that can be implemented
against consumers, in order to obtain their PII. These are the techniques that
require or may benefit from database matching or the use of machine learning.
We will categorize de-anonymizing techniques into those involving 1. structural
re-identification and those involving 2. adversary attribute knowledge.
2.3.1 Structural Re-Identification
Structural re-identification represents any attack technique where an ad-
versary possesses information about the structure of a graph. Fu et al. set forth
a framework with two main methods of social graph deanonymization: seed
matching and node signatures [24]. The first method, seed matching , involves
taking advantage of ‘seeds’: nodes that are present in different graphs, but are
known to represent the same individual. Through using this information, seed
matching techniques are capable of anonymizing individuals at a scope far be-
yond the initial seed. Notably, papers including Yartseva and Grossglauer, as
well as Chiasserini et al. explore the lower limit of seed amount required ini-
tially to successfully de-anonymize a network [55][22], and Naranayan explores
a deanonymization algorithm based in seed identification and propagation [39].
Expanding upon this idea of seed matching, Backstrom et al. makes their own
‘seed’ in the network, through establishing their own nodes, and figuring out
their orientation, thus gaining the ability to comprehend the structure of the
network in its entirety [10]. This seed data is also extremely valuable as training
data, as will be discussed further in Section 2.2.3.
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The second method, node signatures, involves the analysis of node fea-
tures, such as its degree or sub-graphs, in order to de-anonymize. Through the
application of node signatures, via the use of multi-hop neighboring nodes’ infor-
mation, previous works have had success in de-anonymization without needing
seeds [43][30]. Others have directly observed and labeled features, such as in
Ullah et al., when the authors were able to de-anonymize programmers using
code features [50].
2.3.2 Attribute Knowledge
The second overarching deanonymization technique involves taking ad-
vantage of external attribute information. Through the possession of knowledge
outside the data itself, an adversary can identify individuals within a dataset.
This outside knowledge could consist of a separate dataset containing infor-
mation about specific users in the original dataset, targeted knowledge about
individuals present in the original dataset, or it could simply constitute out-
side, factual, un-targeted knowledge about information present in the original
dataset.
Regarding un-targeted information about the original data, Li and Li ex-
plored mining knowledge from the dataset as a means of representing an adver-
sary’s background information based in “absolute facts” and “partial knowledge
of demographic information” [33]. They provide the example of a male, who can
be inferred to not have ovarian cancer, and of a young woman, who we can infer
has a low risk of heart disease, based upon publicly available medical condition
risk data. This type of adversary knowledge is based on reasonable assumptions
derived from knowledge not specific to individuals in the database. Other works
have explored disclosure associated with an attacker possessing background in-
formation that is targeted, and difficult to predict, and have modelled the harm
associated under worst-case circumstances [37][34]. Targeted information is spe-
cific information possessed by the adversary about an individual or individuals
in the dataset. This information could have a variety of origins, ranging from
personal relationships to available data sources. The use of this outside data can
be used in a manner similar to seed nodes, to identify individuals in a dataset
using a process of elimination, aligning known and reported features to the in-
dividuals in the data.
2.3.3 Role of Machine Learning
The use of machine learning in deanonymization has become widespread,
within both of the formerly mentioned seed mapping and attribute knowledge-
based approaches. Machine learning entails the creation of computational mod-
els, through analyzing large amounts of ‘training’ data. The ultimate goal of
machine learning is to give a correct prediction of the output class of an unseen
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example of the same input type as the given training data. There are two main
types of machine learning: supervised and unsupervised. Supervised learn-
ing entails creating a model when the initial training data is labeled with an
associated output class. Alternatively, unsupervised learning entails creat-
ing a model of an underlying structure, when the training data provided is not
labeled, with the ultimate goal of providing a summary of the data.
As outlined in Sharad and Danezis, there is clear potential for the use of
“deanonymization as [a] learning task” [43]. Their study explored the use of a
set of ‘seeds’ as training data for supervised learning applications: specfically,
Sharad and Danezis use seed data as training data with random decision forests,
in order to understand an anonymization algorithm [43]. Others have applied
supervised learning techniques to optimize deanonymization tasks, such as Lee
et al.’s use of a pseudo relevance feedback support vector machine (PRF-SVM)
to optimize graph matching [30], or Li et al.’s use of kernel estimation techniques
to model adversary background knowledge [34].
Alternatively, unsupervised learning techniques may also be applied to datasets
for the purpose of de-anonymization. Gaihre et al., Pham and Lee, and oth-
ers have employed unsupervised learning on cryptocurrency transaction records,
using graph learning to de-anonymize or draw conclusions from clustering users’
transaction data [25] [41].
It is clear that the potential uses of machine learning techniques in the de-
anonymization process have increased, and will likely continue to do so. Aside
from pure de-anonymization, however, machine learning has also allowed for the
deduction of PII from personal information. For example, ethnicity is a data
type that can be considered PII [15], and thus is intended to be allotted extra
protections. However, as Wong et al. demonstrate, PII can be inferred from
information that may not necessarily be considered PII: in their study, they
were able to classify individuals’ ethnicity with 91% accuracy, using only their
name and province [52]. Further, sexual identity was able to be predicted using
machine learning techniques such as a network classifier [28]. In this way, the
power of machine learning to de-anonymize becomes evident: PII stands to be
created from purely personal information.
Supervised and unsupervised learning allow researchers to optimize the pro-
cess of pattern detection, to identify patterns not obvious or logical to humans,
and to draw conclusions about initially innocuous data. It is thus integral to
consider its potential applications when discussing de-anonymization.
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2.4 Modeling Anonymity
Our analysis is motivated by former works that have modeled the ability to
anonymize and de-anonymize, including Ding et al.’s model of de-anonymizing
in social networks [18], Narayanan and Shmatikov’s framework for analyzing
privacy and anonymity in social networks [39], and Hay et al.’s presentation of
models for adversary knowledge, disclosure, and social network anonymity [27].
Other works have further explored modeling the concept of adversary knowl-
edge, notably Li et al. [31] and Li et al. [34]. This adversarial knowledge rep-
resents the ability of an attacker to use an outside database for the purpose of
deanonymization.
Lastly, individuals have modeled the performance of various anonymizing
and de-anonymizing techniques: papers such as Bayardo and Agarwal [11] or
Mauger et al. [38] have explored the optimization of anonymization techniques,
namely k-anonymity. However, to the best of our knowledge, no former model
has focused on the harm resulting from de-anonymization. In this paper, we
explore the nature of the relationship between data content and the capability
and nature of deanonymization.
Chapter 3
Harm
Now that we have thoroughly established the necessary background, we may
turn to our analysis of harm through the deanonymization of personal data. It
is challenging to define harm; legal scholars and technologists alike agree it is
“difficult to quantify and articulate” data’s impact [19]. Largely, it is difficult
to discuss harm without falling into the “creepy trap” [42]. This term, coined
by Richards and Hartzog, serves to remind us that during explorations of this
nature, we must take care to explore not what creeps us out, but rather, “what
information we’re concerned about, in what sense it is “ours,” or why collecting
and aggregating that information is wrong” [19].
We may feel uncomfortable knowing that a company is aware of intimate
details of our lives. Take for example, the well-known case that swept through
national news outlets, detailing how Target was carrying out extensive purchase
analysis to determine the likelihood that a woman was pregnant [20]. Target
would then use this information to provide targeted advertising to pregnant
women, to encourage them to make purchases at their stores. The news story
told of a high school girl receiving these ads for maternity items, prior to her
parents knowing she was pregnant.
The daughter in this news story would likely feel ‘creeped out’ that Target
realized she was pregnant before her own parents. Yet, we must differentiate
between personal and “the illusion of personal” in the realm of advertising–we
must examine whether data truly “contain identifiable information about the
user” [19].
As Richards and Hartzog explain, “data being processed for advertising isn’t
“yours”, in that, “it doesn’t identify you as the source” [19]. It is not necessarily
your data that is valuable, but rather the “preferences, habits, and transactions
of large numbers of users, which are consolidated, mined, and analyzed to find
patterns and common behavior” [19]. Thus, it is hard to assign blanket def-
initions to what content is harmful and what content is not, and who ought
14
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to be authorized for viewership and who ought not to be. As we will further
explore, this concept is dramatically influenced by the data’s subject, viewer,
and content. A first example of harm is investigated in the work of Hartzog
and Richards, which proposes harm through the chilling effect [19]. The chilling
effect represents the deterrent of ”free speech and association rights protected
by the First Amendment as a result of government laws or actions that appear
to target expression” [9]. This indirect suppression through intimidation is put
forth as a form of harm that can result from deanonymization. In an oppressive
regime one may feel intimidated to publicly speak in opposition of their gov-
ernment; likewise, individuals may not carry out trackable actions online when
they know that those actions can be traced back to their true identity, out of
fear of repercussion.
Similarly, Solove and Citron explore the concept of harm through anxiety
and risk [46]. Deanonymization clearly increases risks for things like identity
fraud, through the deanonymization and exposure of personally identifiable in-
formation. Solove and Citron provide justification for the fact that common law
recognizes ”increased risk of harm as an intangible injury worthy of redress”
[46]. Further, the revealing of one’s true information can be anxiety inducing,
particularly when one is made aware of these accompanying risks. Solove and
Citron therefore argue that we can think of these concepts of anxiety and risk
as a source of harm, through the emotional burden of anxiety and risk.
This leads to our current dilemma: our inability to predict future harms.
While common law suggests that the risk of harm is worthy of punitive mea-
sures, there is currently no method to quantify the inherent risk of the release
of a dataset. That is what this work seeks to produce, a model of privacy harm
to assist in risk analysis.
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As we work towards establishing this model, this section will
1. Elaborate upon the methods of generating harm (using the techniques
explored in background)
2. Explore the intricacies of defining harm
3. Propose our model of this harm
3.1 Generating Harm
We seek to quantify two modern methods of generating harm: gener-
ation through the use of database operations and through the use of machine
learning techniques.
3.1.1 Database Operations
To consider database operations in our model, we must first define a relevant
database. An aset is an attribute set, represented A; a database of personal in-
formation is a set of asets: various attributes form the columns of a database
table, and each row of data about an individual is represented as an aset A.
Naturally, no real database has all columns for all people; even in principle, a
real database will contain only a subset of columns. For a typical web advertiser
the columns might represent attributes such as interests, web sites visited, IP
geolocation, etc. Furthermore, the rows of a real database—-that is, the people
the asets are about—-will not be all-encompassing. For example, Acxiom, one
of the largest data brokers, has records on 700,000,000 people [44]; these records
have an average of 1,500 attributes per person [49]. Because collections of asets
are database tables, standard database operations such as union (∪), join (./),
and select (σ) may be performed on pairs of tables. The semantics, however,
are slightly different.1
Join Operations (./)
The ‘join’ operation represents combining database rows into one, based
upon a similarity in a database column. In our case, this means merging at-
tributes associated with the same individual, into a single row For example, if a
user had information present in two different databases, a join operation would
entail combining the information from the rows of both of these databases into
a new row. This can be seen in Figure 3.1, where two datasets contain informa-
tion. There is a similarity present in the ‘email’ database column, that allows
for a join operation, combining the information from both databases.
In principle, two authoritative databases should have identical values for any
given attribute for a given person; in practice, however, there may be discrep-
ancies. In such situations, the result is implementation-defined; values may be
1From a draft paper by Steven Bellovin
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Figure 3.1: Demonstration of a database join operation.
flagged with a probability value indicating a lesser degree of certainty. Ordinary
join operations work by matching records based on some attributes, however,
some organizations do heuristic matches based on less-certain data, to han-
dle situations such as different renderings of a name (“Steven Bellovin” versus
“Steven M. Bellovin” versus “Steve Bellovin” versus mistakes like “Stephen
Bellovin”), variant transliterations from other alphabets (“Muhammed” versus
“Mohammed”), common names causing mismatches (not just “John Smith” but
also “John Smith, Jr.” and “John Smith, Sr.”), data entry errors, and so on.
Therefore, although ordinary join operations elide rows from one database that
do not match a row in the other, it is often desirable to include such rows but
to use the symbol ‘⊥’ for missing values in this use case. A heuristic join is
denoted .̇/2.
Through the use of join operations, we can leverage data from multiple
databases to create stronger user profiles and more significant privacy violations.
3.1.2 Machine Learning Techniques
In the context of database matching, it is valuable to conclude that an indi-
vidual with a given email in one database is likely the same person as an individ-
ual in a different database with the same email. While it can prove difficult to
confirm the accuracy of these connections with certainty, the augmentation of a
database to include a greater scope of data is very powerful for deanonymization,
and thus justifies the inclusion of inferred or uncertain values. As explored in
Section 2.3.3, there are numerous machine learning techniques that can be used
2From a draft paper by Steven Bellovin
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to produce harm, especially when it comes to augmenting inference capability.
Through machine learning’s ability to learn complex patterns, we can connect
social graphs, find potential join database operations, and bring new meaning to
data within the database, extrapolating based upon information that is present.
By using supervised and unsupervised learning techniques with external and
internal information from a dataset, we can predict the identity of individuals in
a dataset. Similar to the aforementioned join database operation, we can train
neural networks to recognize rows of data about the same individual in different
datasets. However, these networks may identify heuristics that might not be
obvious to an individual carrying out database matching, potentially improving
performance.
More generally, machine learning augments deanonymization by inference,
giving the ability to expand a database beyond its original scope. Using ma-
chine learning, we can predict an individual’s interests based upon information
listed about them; for example, in Wong et al.’s work, machine learning gives
us the ability to infer and individual’s ethnicity by their name and province,
with an accuracy rate of 91% [52]. We could thus add an additional column to
a given table of personal information for ethnicity, with a value of the ethnicity
produced by Wong et al.’s model, and a heuristic of 91%. In this way, we can
use machine learning to add or fill in additional rows, based upon the produced
inference values and heuristics. Similar to the heuristic join of database op-
erations, the likelihood of an inference in machine learning can be expressed
through the probability associated with a value label. The methods for re-
turning this label probability will vary by learning technique: for example, this
likelihood value could be represented by the maximum likelihood in a likelihood
function, or by a closeness measure in the context of a clustering mechanism.
All of the methods outlined in Section 2.3.3, from optimization matching meth-
ods to unsupervised graph learning [30][25], expand a dataset to give it greater
deanonymizing capability.
3.2 Exploring Harm
Now that we have examined new methods of generating harm, we may ex-
plore the integral qualities of harm that will be necessary to portray in any
harm model; namely, that harm is user-dependent, viewer-dependent, inter-
dependent, and cumulative.
3.2.1 Harm is User-Dependent
Harm is, by nature, user-dependent, as different information is private to dif-
ferent users. For example, consider information regarding an individual’s sexual
and gender identity. All users of Tinder provide this information to the app,
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for the purpose of finding appropriate partners. However, the desired privacy
surrounding this data varies greatly from individual to individual. A straight
male living in the United States will likely have little problem with this data
being released; while, a gay man in Egypt would potentially face discrimina-
tion, and even jail time—Egyptian men were jailed for their sexual identity
under“indecency” laws, based upon social media and dating app presence, ac-
cording to Human Rights Watch [51][16].
Similarly, the ability to indirectly disclose information (including sexuality)
from one’s social graph has been proven effective[28]—no longer is direct leakage
of this data in its pure form the only danger. Through the use of machine
learning, one can infer information about you from the information of those you
interact with. This is dangerous considering our presentation of harm as user-
dependent: one is not in control of the flow of information about them, even
though this information is perceived as more or less private on an individual
basis. Perceived harm may vary greatly, due to its status as user-dependent.
3.2.2 Harm is Viewer-Dependent
In the same manner, harm is viewer-dependent, to account for varying in-
tentions and capabilities regarding data use. Take medical data as an example:
while an individual may be comfortable with their medical disorder being shared
with their care professional or a company that can help them to recommend
appropriate treatment, there would be significantly more perceived harm if the
user’s medical information were revealed to, for instance, an insurance company.
The content of the data is not inherently dangerous in the hands of a doctor,
but is definitively so in the hands of an insurance agent, who could potentially
raise their premium. In this way, the harm the data poses is viewer-dependent.
As in the aforementioned example, harm could be viewer-dependent due
to the position or career of the viewer. Additionally, this dependency could
relate to the background knowledge possessed by the viewer, or the relation-
ship between the viewer and the individual. Background knowledge comes in
many forms, and can be valuable in de-anonymizing through providing enough
information to identify a user in a dataset. As discussed in Section 2.3.2,
de-anonymized individuals can serve as seed data, allowing for larger scale
deanonymization. For a simple example, if you knew that Bob’s birthday was in
May 1975, and only one individual in the dataset had a birthday in May 1975,
you would be able to de-anonymize Bob. Knowing who Bob was in the dataset
would potentially allow you to identify others in the dataset by elimination.
Harm can be significantly increased when a viewer possesses this background
knowledge. In this way, background knowledge is a factor that contributes to
harm being viewer-dependent.
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3.2.3 Harm is Inter-Dependent
Harm is also inter-dependent: individual data points and datasets can im-
pact our ability to anonymize or deanonymize other data. In anonymizing,
as Zhou et al. explain, “changing labels of vertices and edges may affect the
neighborhoods of other vertices, and removing or adding vertices and edges may
affect other vertices and edges as well as the properties of the network” [57].
Likewise, as discussed in Section 2.3.1, one individual’s identity can be used
to identify others in the dataset, through process of elimination. Data cannot
be considered independent: it must be considered in the scope of the dataset
as a whole, keeping in mind principles such as k-anonymity, and considering
information contained in other public datasets.
3.2.4 Harm is Cumulative
Lastly, harm is cumulative. As previously discussed in the context of database
matching, combining various data sources increases the risk of deanonymization,
and allows for greater information to be revealed about an individual in the pro-
cess. Obviously, the more information that is revealed, the more information an
adversary posses, and can use to identify and harm an individual.
3.3 Modeling Harm
In this work, we seek to create a model quantifying an architecture’s privacy
impact. We incorporate our new understanding of harm resulting from the use
of adversarial learning and database operations, and express the principles of
harm in a formal manner. Through the application of this model, we hope to
provide guidance in making decisions regarding the release and regulation of
datasets containing information about individuals. Our hope is that this model
will serve as a general framework for approaching the question of data release
safety.
In our model, we consider an attribute set (aset) A, that is made up of
name/value/probability triples ai =< ni, vi, pi > such as <phone number, 202-
555-1212, 1> or <zipcode, 10027, .9>. The type of the value is attribute-
dependent; it may be a Boolean (<retired, True>), a set (<hobbies, woodwork-
ing,cooking, bicycling>), etc. This aset represents the contents of a database.
From this aset A, machine learning and database operations provide the ability
to create A’. The extra items A’ - A are putative facts produced not by direct
observation but by calculation; as such, they generally have probability values
less than 1. This aspect, that we can now reason about predicted attributes
rather than just observed ones, is the defining cause of our need to reconsider
our current approach to harm. We can represent the formation of this aset A’
by function M : A → A’ such that A ⊆ A’.
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Through this function, we have expanded aset A’, containing the contents
of A, along with additional, uncertain but probable information included about
individuals in the dataset. Additionally, we define a harm set, H, consisting
of functions, hj . Each of these hj ’s represent a function over a subset of an
aset. We define the specific attributes from A’ that serve as parameters to each
function hj as σ.
Using this information, we formulate our model, representing an architec-
ture’s total potential harm to privacy:∑
hj∈H hj(σjA
′)
Alongside older methodologies surrounding data anonymity, such as privacy
violations involving direct identifier association, this model reflects the harm
that arises from new methods including machine learning or database matching.
This model allows for the inclusion of decentralized and indirectly identifying
data, which represents a majority of modern potential harm to privacy. Func-
tion M allows us to include data that was indirectly identifiable through means
such as database matching or machine learning, via creating the expanded aset
A’ from the original aset A.
Our model reflects the user and viewer dependent nature of harm via the
harm functions hj ∈ H. A harm function could assign weights to values for a
characteristic; assigning a higher weight for a values that cause more harm. For
instance, in the previous example surrounding sexual identity, a higher weight
could be assigned for the gay man in Egypt than to the straight man in the
United States. Due to the open-ended nature of the harm function, the model
is capable of accounting for the assignment of varying levels of harm based upon
these more intricate and situation-dependent considerations. Additionally, the
summation allows the model to reflect the cumulative nature of harm, as it cre-
ates a system where the total harm is a function of all smaller harms.
Lastly, this model is capable of describing the interdependent nature of harm,
through the inclusion of σj as a potential input. σj represents not a piece of
data, but rather a subset of data, that act as parameters for a given harm func-
tion hj . This proves significant through representing the interaction of various
data pieces; we are capable of assessing the dataset at varying scales–evaluating
deanonymization capability based on attribute knowledge or seed data, both at
a local level and a global level. σj allow us to identify others in the dataset,
through examining the scope of the dataset as a whole. Additionally, the M
function allows for the inter-dependency of the values in the dataset to be re-
flected in A’. For instance, two non-PII data values can be used to infer a PII
data value using machine learning, as described earlier in the case of Wong et
al.’s ability to infer ethnicity by name and province [52].
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However, there is information regarding harm that is not reflected in our
model. Namely, our model does not reflect the cost of harm: we do not represent
how much work or money will be necessary to carry out the deanonymization.
Just because deanonymization is possible does not mean it is likely or feasible,
and our model does not account for this fact. Our model solely reflects the
amount and impact of the potential privacy violations of a given architecture,
not the difficulty in achieving those violations. Additionally, the model does not
definitively answer whether the deanonymization or privacy violations of this
type are inherently damaging in a legal sense: while we can quantify the amount
of harm, we cannot say whether this harm should have legal standing, or es-
tablish a threshold for permissiblity. Rather, we propose that this equation can
provide guiding principles to those making decisions related to personal data.
The status quo does not provide any regulatory framework, and largely does
not consider the damaging affects of increased dataset augmentation capability.
Our model seeks to introduce these considerations into the data release process,
and to encourage evaluation to be formed on the basis of harm.
Chapter 4
Experiments
In order to examine potential applications of our model, we performed two
experiments; the first attempting to identify machine learning usage on What-
sApp social graph metadata, and the second applying database matching be-
tween a database of Tinder user data and a University Directory. Through these
experiments, we sought to identify the formerly discussed principles of harm. In
Chapter 5, we will apply our model of harm to these experiments.
4.1 WhatsApp
Our first experiment (IRB-AAAT3566) sought to examine the role of infer-
ence in Facebook’s creation of social graphs, using WhatsApp communications
metadata. Specifically, we aimed to distinguish whether there was any iden-
tifiable connection between individuals’ connections on WhatsApp and their
Interest Profile on Facebook.
WhatsApp is an encrypted messaging service owned by Facebook; however,
the metadata of these messages is not encrypted. Metadata is data about data:
in the context of a WhatsApp message, the message text would be the data,
while metadata would contain information such as who the message was sent to,
what time it was sent, and where it was sent from. Although this information
seems harmless, messaging metadata is vast and has significant potential for
meaningful and identifying analysis. As Facebook specializes in advertising and
the creation of thorough user profiles, it seemed plausible that they would be
analyzing this communications metadata for advertising purposes. We therefore
expected to identify WhatsApp using communications metadata and machine
learning capabilities to determine connections, using structural re-identification-
based methods elaborated upon in Section 2.3.1, and/or using machine learn-
ing based technology to understand what interaction qualities were valuable in
quantifying connection. We set out to identify any signs that this metadata was
being used by Facebook for advertising purposes.
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4.1.1 Experimental Set Up
In order to show that communications were impacting advertising, we needed
to create an artificial social network for exchanging communications. We there-
fore recruited 30 participants, from both Columbia and across the United States,
to be a part of our artificial social network. Prior to the involvement of partic-
ipants, we created a Facebook account for one of the researchers on a virtual
machine, and establish an initial user profile through liking several Facebook
pages from Alexa Top 500 Websites [3]. Additionally, we created a WhatsApp
account with the same phone number to associate with the Facebook account.
We allowed this account to remain unaffected by outside influence for one week.
Throughout this time period, we collected the Facebook account’s listed profile
interests and suggested advertisements, so as to provide a ‘control’ user profile.
After this control period, we began meeting with participants. At the meet-
ing, we asked each participant to provide us with their listed “User Ad Interests”
on Facebook. To simplify this process we created a script that collected text
from the user’s screen once they had navigated to the appropriate page. We
then either made them a part of the control group, or informed them they had
been selected to exchanged messages on WhatsApp with the lab account. After
this portion of the study, we waited 48 hours after a participant interaction,
and then collected the study’s Facebook account’s listed profile interests. We
ask participants to use the script to collect their listed profile interests, to track
any potential changes in their interests as well. We additionally exchanged
messages with participants selected for the ’WhatsApp’ group, asking a series
of questions about whether they thought their user profile representations were
accurate. We continued this collection process for a period of 10 days, collecting
data from each participant a total of four times. We thus sought to identify if
there was a relationship between the user profile interests of the participants
and the user profile interests of the controlled Facebook account. We expected
that, if metadata was being used, the interests of participants would begin to
appear in the interests of the study account, due to the establishment of a social
connection between the two accounts.
4.1.2 Results
After ten days, the lab’s account did not have any additions to the listed
user profile interests, and the study was thus inconclusive. If this metadata was
a factor in advertising formation, it was not significant enough of a factor to
influence the study account’s advertising. This does not necessarily mean that
Facebook is not using WhatsApp communications metadata to target adver-
tising. We hypothesize that the amount of communication was not significant
enough to have impact on Facebook’s functionality, or that the length of time in
which the participants exchanged messages with the lab account was not long
enough. It would be rewarding future work to repeat this experiment, with a
longer time span and more variance and consistency in participant interactions.
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4.2 Tinder & University Databases
Tinder is the most popular dating application in the United States, with al-
most eight million users in the US as of 2020 [47]. With a user base of this size
and sensitive data involving gender and sexual identity, it is especially impor-
tant to consider whether Tinder is doing everything they can to protect against
modern threats, and further, whether they are using and managing their data
responsibly.
Tinder is currently under formal EU investigation with regards to data pri-
vacy issues[35], and after investigating a CCPA release form, it is clear that Tin-
der is not treating users’ data as they should: as personal, private information.
Given recent events, including the current European Union GDPR investiga-
tion into Tinder, as well as Match Group’s own admission of data breaches due
to API vulnerabilities and lack of encryption, it’s crucial to analyze Tinder’s
practices. This experiment (IRB-AAAT5771) sought to investigate the ability
to perform large-scale deanonymization using information available on Tinder’s
API, using database matching with publicly available University directories.
The availability to perform data matching of this type between databases that
contain information including email, mailing and residential addresses, or place
of employment, in relation to Tinder API data containing information regarding
first name, sexual identity, age, and photos, is clearly dangerous in the hands of
an adversary. We examine the potential danger for data misuse given Tinder’s
current API structure and the power of database matching.
4.2.1 Experimental Set Up
One of the study coordinators created a Tinder account, using their email,
photo, identity, etc. to register. We set an age range for the account that
seeks university-aged students, so as to target users with TinderU-the feature
where students associate their profile with a university. We additionally set a
target location: we selected the area surrounding a university town. We then
collected information from the API responses about potential matches using
Fiddler, a web debugger. This information consisted of the individual’s first
name, approximate age, bio, and frequently, university or place of employment.
We identified the portion of the population that listed the specific university in
their profile. Of the 1573 total profiles that we collected, 986 were eligible under
these conditions.
We then used a script to search the university’s database for profile matches.
First, we searched this database using only first name, attempting to see how
many perfect exact matches we could find, where only one person with that name
existed, thus attempting to form connections between potential profiles on these
different databases, using only the information provided on the Tinder API as
a ‘database key’. Second, we included secondary information available on the
profile: sometimes, users had their major listed. Third, we sought to establish
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTS 26
exact name matches (not including close matches): while this introduces error,
we wanted to explore potential performance.
4.2.2 Results
Our experiment puts forward a method of deanonymization with significant
return at scale. For the first method, which queries the University database only
based on first name, 92 out of the 980 profiles we examined were identifiable,
giving us an identification rate of 10%. This means that when the first name
was queried in the university database, for about 10% of the queries, only one
individual with the given first name was returned.
Further, as can be seen in the first graph in Figure 4.1, for the whole of the
dataset, not only were the number of exact matches high, but much of the data
is largely clustered along the lower end of match numbers.
Figure 4.1: Exact Profile Matches By First Name Only
Taking a closer look at this cluster on the lower end, the second graph in
Figure 4.1 displays the frequency of match numbers less than 20.
This proves to be particularly disturbing: with 471 profiles with 20 or less
matches, and 284 profiles with 5 or less matches, these profiles are surely vul-
nerable as well through secondary methods. For example, to discern between
the five potential profiles, the photos posted on the Tinder Profile could be
matched with those returned by an image search engine. This is surely less
straightforward than our current approach, but not out of the question, using
an API such as DeepAI’s Image Similarity API. It appears additional methods
could supplement this method, and further increase the rate of identification.
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTS 27
In order to explore this, we did a minor addition to our current method,
parsing the bios for listed majors to match with majors listed on the University
directory and looking for exact name matches. With this new method, 117 out of
980 profiles were identifiable, increasing our capability to a 12% identification
rate. The spread is displayed in Figure 4.2, showing a similar structure to
Figures 4.1, for the original dataset.
Figure 4.2: Exact Profile Matches With Increased Heuristics
It is important to think about this de-identification as more than quantities.
We examine the content that is available to the public from our institution’s
(Columbia’s) directory about a student. Published information including the
student’s home (dorm), mailing, and email address draws concern. When in-
dividuals sign up for Tinder accounts, they choose to publish their first name,
their photos, where they go to school. However, it seems unlikely that Tinder
users would willingly release information to potential romantic matches that
included their home address. The alignment of personal information including
sexual identity and preference with sensitive contact information is potentially
dangerous in the world we live in; the ability to deanonymize this dataset is not
a matter of improving functionality, but of ensuring the safety of users. When
we look at other organizations that collect large scale data about topics includ-
ing sexuality and race, we see significant attempts at maintaining privacy for
the individuals the data is about. The U.S. Census, for example, implements
in depth data perturbation techniques prior to data release; companies such as
Apple investigate differentially private mechanisms in data collection and use
[5] [8]. While the same scales and methods may be unreasonable, Tinder ought
to be following suit in prioritizing consumer protection. At a minimum, Tin-
der has the ability to restructure their API in a manner that would cause this
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method of large-scale database matching to be challenging, if not impossible.
However, it is difficult to place the entirety of the blame upon Tinder. While
Tinder’s implementation allows for de-anonymization at a large scale, the pub-
lication of University databases would still allow for this process to be carried
out manually, regardless of Tinder’s design choices. If, for example, a stalker
saw a Tinder profile associated with TinderU, they would be able to manu-
ally search a university directory with the profile information shown on their
screen. In this way, the University Directory is truly the source of PII that
raises concern: the posting of private information in the format of a student
directory is protected under The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA), allowing for very little accountability in its dangerous potential uses.
It is these types of considerations that our model hopes to bring to light; our
framework will encourage Tinder to reconsider their API response format, and
would likely discourage the publication of university directories. Through the
implementation of these changes our model suggests, Tinder-using students’ risk




Our experiments allow us to contextualize our disclosure model; in order to
comprehend how our model of dataset privacy can be used in real world decisions
involving data release. As formerly mentioned, our model for predictive privacy
harms leads us to examine the harm of a dataset individually and in combination
with other related datasets. Therefore, as a case study, we may evaluate the
datasets involved in our Tinder experiment, individually and in combination.
5.1 Contextualizing The Model
As a refresher, we model the privacy harm of a dataset with:∑
hj∈H hj(σjA
′)
where A’ is the set containing the original set A and additional reasonably
deduced information, hjs in harm set H are functions over subsets of A’, and σ
represents the specific subsets and parameters for an hj . Given this model, we
may examine how Tinder’s data and the University’s data would be represented
by our model. We can begin with a dataset, containing information published
via Tinder’s API. In our model, set A represents the original dataset’s contents.
We can thus consider the set A to be the whole of the API data published: the
first name, approximate birth year, bio, photos, school/workplace, etc. of all
Tinder users. Example data is shown in Figure 5.1.
A’ is a set expanded from A, representing inferrable information obtained by
calculation, observation, or any method resulting in a match with an accuracy
probability of less than 1. Therefore, A’ would be made up of A, as well as all
data that can be reasonably inferred from the original Tinder data. Because the
scope of the Tinder data is so large, including personal information, this A’ will
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Figure 5.1: Example of aset data from Tinder
be quite substantial. For example, we could expand A to A’ through the use of
a public database, such as a database of Facebook profiles: through matching
existing Facebook profiles, we could identify whether there is an existing profile
that has the same first name, approximate age, and approximate location as
the Tinder user. Depending on the nature of the match, we can infer that this
profile is that of the individual represented in the database; therefore, with some
probability that the match is correct, we can infer the additional information
contained in the Facebook profile, such as the interests or relationship status
listed in the profile, or the names of individuals’ friends or family. Figure 5.2
demonstrates an example of this expanded aset.
Figure 5.2: Example of expanded aset data from the original Tinder aset data
using interest data
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Other A’ expansion methods could include the process we carried out in our
experiment: instead of using Facebook, we instead used the University database
to expand the asets. In this way, we can expand A’ to include information such
as a student’s email, home, or mailing address. Figure 5.3 demonstrates an
example of this expanded aset.
Figure 5.3: Example of expanded aset data from the original Tinder aset data
using directory data
Additionally, as in Wong et al.’s work mentioned in 2.3.3 [52], we could use
machine learning to deduce sensitive information, such as ethnicity, from names
and approximate location (provided to the mile by Tinder). This would further
increase the harm potential of a dataset, through the inclusion of greater PII
associated with a user profile. Generally speaking, we must examine the po-
tential of the deanonymization techniques discussed in Section 2.3, accounting
for how structural re-identification and adversary attribute knowledge can be
applied to a subset of A’. In this way, we can produce an extensive collection of
asets originating from the original collection, A. This allows us to amass large
amounts of data about Tinder users, albeit with reduced certainty.
Given this new collection, we may examine the harm functions in the con-
text of our A’. As a reminder, a harm function, abbreviated hj , is a function
over a subset of A’, that expresses specific aspects of harm a data poses. This
may include the specific characteristics of harm that we discussed in Section 3,
such as its user-dependent, viewer-dependent, inter-dependent, and cumulative
nature. Consider harm functions we could establish for our expanded collection,
A’. We may begin by considering the inter-dependent nature of harm. Specific
information in collection A’ becomes more revealing when used in the context
of other information in A’: for example, possessing only an email alone may
allow a bad actor to send spam mail in a random manner. However, when one
possesses then name, age, and names of family members, of the individual the
data is about, a bad actor is able to effectively target a victim in manners such
as phishing, impersonation attacks, etc. An email alone may not be powerful
for phishing; but the more detailed information possessed about the recipient,
the better.
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In this way, this example also demonstrates the cumulative nature of harm,
through showing the greater the amount of data, generally, the greater the abil-
ity to exploit. We could convey that this data is more valuable, say, for instance,
in bulk, and create a harm function with a parameter (σ) representative of the
size of the dataset.
Additionally, we may consider the viewer-dependent nature of harm arising
from our expanded Tinder dataset. Tinder is a dating app; we must there-
fore consider that there is an increased risk for stalking-related incidents. This
consideration leads us to associate increased harm with data that would be
more valuable to an individual seeking to stalk: for example, we could weight
information such as the home address or email to a greater degree, given the
situationally more sensitive nature of this information.
Similarly, we could convey that the data is more valuable in the hands of a
data broker than of a college student: while a college student may simply want
to check that their Tinder date is who they say they are before agreeing to meet
them in person, a data broker or stalker can do far more damage with knowledge
of personal information. Likewise, some individuals on Tinder may value the
privacy of their sexual orientation more than others–these harm functions allow
us to represent this fact.
Using this model, we may quantify these harm functions and function pa-
rameters. For example, we could consider the initial harm function we discussed,
involving the increased value with accumulated data. Given that we have an
email, which we have assigned an arbitrary harm value parameter of .1, we may
assign increasing harm parameters (σ) for the inclusion of other information in
addition to this email: we can represent the independent nature of the data.
While alone, knowledge of a user interest may not be valuable, when we have an
email and learn user interests, we can represent this increased value by giving
a higher harm value to the released interest data.
Similarly, we could convey that this variety of data is more valuable, for
instance, in bulk, and create a harm function with a parameter (σ), that rep-
resents the size of the dataset, or a parameter that gives value to the viewer’s
qualities: for example, assigning a high harm value to a dataset that will be
accessed by data brokers, and a lower harm value to a dataset that will be ac-
cessed by college students.
In this way, we can assign a value to the harm of a dataset. While currently
the parameter values are up to the individual, interesting further work could
explore more specific assignment of these values; for example, demonstrating
that an email is ten times more valuable than a first name in a deanonymization
task.
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5.2 Applying The Model
5.2.1 Data Anonymization
We can apply our aggregate risk assessment, and its guiding principles, in
design and release decisions. We can consider how the anonymization techniques
discussed in Section 2.2 can be applied to our A, in order to narrow the scope
of A’ and the capabilities of hjs in set H. Beyond rudimentary techniques of
removing identifiers such as names, the aforementioned methods intended to
achieve k-anonymity or l-diversity act as methods of eliminating harm. By crit-
ically evaluating a dataset in the context of our model, we can make decisions
regarding the extent of de-identification necessary, and the most effective meth-
ods for doing so. We can further determine the safety of a data release-through
critically evaluating its performance.
For example, we may take our specific consideration of our dataset from
Tinder. If we were Tinder, and planning to release this dataset for public ac-
cessibility, we could use the model in the aforementioned manner, producing a
relative value for harm. As we have outlined above, this dataset’s harm value
would likely be unacceptable. This signifies to Tinder that action needs to be
taken prior to release, whether that be reducing the amount or content of the
information published, or using de-identifying techniques to reduce the risk of
harmful data usage.
If the end use for the dataset was to understand the average age of a Tinder
user, Tinder could simply practice cell suppression, removing every variable
except for age, as shown in 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Example of data for release via cell suppression
Alternatively, if the end goal for this dataset is aggregate statistical use,
Tinder could implement a differentially private mechanism on the dataset. This
allows for full data release, as differential privacy modifies the dataset through
the addition of random noise, providing a privacy guarantee. Differential privacy
would largely maintain aggregate statistical values for a dataset, as shown in
5.5, and would thus be an effective method for this use case.
When implemented correctly, differential privacy can allow for no harm to
arise from release. In this way, our model helps us to consider when and how to
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Figure 5.5: Example of data for release using differential privacy
use de-identifying mechanisms, and leads us to reflect upon whether data needs
to be released in the first place.
5.2.2 Data Policy Regulation
Likewise, one may use our model to guide policy regarding harm. Today,
existing data privacy legislation functions largely around disclosure. Under leg-
islation such as the CCPA, parties must disclose what personal information is
being collected. However, with the exception of special cases like health data,
permissible content to be collected and released is largely unregulated. In the
case of Tinder, when a user signs up, they click a button that signifies agreeing
to a lengthy privacy policy. A part of this policy states:
”We may use and share non-personal information (meaning in-
formation that, by itself, does not identify who you are such as
device information, general demographics, general behavioral data,
geolocation in de-identified form), as well as personal information
in hashed, non-human readable form, under any of the above cir-
cumstances...We may combine this information with additional non-
personal information or personal information in hashed, non-human
readable form collected from other sources” [2].
In this way, under legislation such as the CCPA, users will have agreed to hav-
ing their data stored, combined, and ultimately released in a non-readable form.
Our model clearly shows the danger of these practices under current policy.
Rather than approaching privacy harm as a matter of user consent, our
model urges us to evaluate the harm of data on a case by case basis. Consent
is not enough to prevent privacy violations: it is an unfair and unrealistic stan-
dard to lay the burden of analysis on the consumer. A lay person will likely not
have the time, motivation, or knowledge to thoroughly analyze every agreement
they enter with a company. As we have explored, even to look at solely the
original dataset itself is not enough to understand the inherent associated harm
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with its release. The average consumer will likely not have a holistic view of
the power of inference, and will not understand that even the information they
are consenting to share is not limited to what the information they specifically
provide.
Our model displays the complexity of decisions surrounding database re-
lease, and urges us to include its considerations into the data release workflow.
In today’s world, it should be mandated that a company consider the risks
and potential harms resulting from the use of database operations or machine
learning techniques on a dataset. Our model hopes to provide a framework for
organizations to do so.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Recent innovations in data analysis have made it challenging to evaluate the
safety of dataset release—there are new considerations when deciding whether
to release a dataset as is, to implement methods such as differential privacy,
or to not collect or release data at all. While there is no panacea for privacy
preservation, there exist a number of effective methods for combating adversar-
ial attacks on datasets. From systems such as differential privacy, which provide
privacy guarantees, to methods that simply suppress data cells, the anonymiza-
tion techniques outlined in background together have tremendous capability to
protect individuals and data from harm. The problem we currently face is how
and when to implement these methods—our model hopes to contribute to solv-
ing this issue.
Without appropriately addressing the type and extent of harms a dataset
poses, one cannot choose the appropriate method to protect against them, or
be held liable for the harm caused if they are mishandled. Current understand-
ing of a dataset’s harm if no longer applicable. A new form of understanding
of dataset harm is needed, one which considers the power of machine learn-
ing and database matching techniques to de-anonymize; these methods increase
individuals’ risk of emotional, financial, or even physical harm. Through under-
standing the harm a dataset poses, we may evaluate the need and appropriate
methods for data anonymization: by understanding what we are defending and
from whom, we may pick the best defense mechanism.
Thus, we sought to identify specific factors that increase risk of harm when
present in a dataset.
The large-scale deanonmyization of two datasets via approximated join op-
erations (Section 4.2) allowed us to examine the new source of harm posed by
database matching. With a match rate of as high as 15% for sensitive infor-
mation pertaining to gender identity, sexual identity, and residential addresses,
the Tinder case study merits concern for individuals’ safety and security. We
demonstrated the significant potential for harm posed by database matching
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with publicly available datasets, validating our need for a new framework for
thinking about harm. We further investigated qualities that lead to an increased
risk of harm, including the viewer-dependent, user-dependent, inter-dependent,
and cumulative nature of harm. In this work, we formulated a model based
upon these qualities, intended to evaluate a dataset’s harm potential, account-
ing for these specific harm factors. Through the use of this model, we aim to
provide guidance regarding a data architecture’s privacy impact.
We hope our model will allow individuals to think about privacy impact
quantifiably, thus giving rise to more formal best practices surrounding data
de-identification, and laying the ground work for greater regulation regarding
data safety. When harm from data release is thought about as more than a
nebulous hypothetical, but rather as a tangible concept, reasonable guidelines
can be put forth to protect consumers and citizens.
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